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The foundation of readiness is training. The Ch
Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Joint Training Pro
institutes methods for identifying training requ
through review of the Commander-in-Chief’s 
missions and the compilation of Joint Mission E
Task Lists. The Universal Joint Task List comp
sively outlines these joint essential tasks, pro
summary of CINC missions, joint tasks, and 
sponding supporting and enabling tasks. Compu
exercises (CAXs) are tools available for monitor
training a staff in these tasks. CAXs are an esse
of staff training, although one of their major we
is their inability to accurately measure the 
training received by the players. This paper de
exercise analysis methodology for evaluating
event causal audit trails. Specific objectives
determine quantifiable measures of effec
designed to work with data manipulated by c
simulations and to test MOEs using the Joint 
Level Simulation (JTLS). This includes the develo
of post-exercise analysis techniques for warga
This paper provides a methodology for ex
appropriate data from a CAX to develop caus
trails for critical events. The results of a CAX w
be more available for trend analysis and feedba
1  INTRODUCTION
In peacetime, military professionals must acq
skills and develop the confidence and initiative n
to conduct joint and combined operations.
professional schools are fundamentally important, the
military is a hands-on profession and most learn
levels is accomplished while participating in unit trainin
and operations. Hence, realistic, demandin
objectively measured training and exercises are
































Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) Memorandum of Polic
(MOP 26) establishes a program for carrying out th
joint training responsibilities of the CJCS, the
Commanders-in-Chief (CINCs), and the CIN
component staffs. MOP 26 institutes a meth
identifying training requirements through the review
the CINC’s mission and the compilation of es
tasks required to accomplish that mission. Each comp
task list is called the CINC’s Joint Mission Ess
Task List (JMETL).
A CINC’s JMETL is intended to provide the b
for all joint training. A JMETL consists of those 
deemed essential for accomplishment of ope
plans, predicated on the missions assigned an
apportioned to the CINC, U.S. alliances or trea
regio al initiatives. A JMETL includes Joint Mis
Essential Tasks, supporting tasks considered ess
acc mplishment of the Joint Mission Essential 
and enabling tasks.
The Universal Joint Task List (UJTL), a supplem
to the Joint Training Manual (MCM 71-92), outli
comprehensive list of joint essential tasks (JCS
and provides:
· A summary listing of CINC Missions.
· A list of Joint Tasks, the corresponding Sup
ing Tasks, and their Enabling Tasks.
· A detailed dictionary of the Joint Tasks, Su
ing Tasks, and the Enabling Tasks, desc
each task in detail.
For consistency and comparability purpose
CINC is required to develop a JMETL based on
missions and essential tasks outlined in the U
Joint Task List document. The CINCs are respons
identifying their major missions from the su
listing; mapping the major missions to the join
d termining the joint tasks which are most cr
































































































934 Parry, McAneny, and Dromerhauseridentifying which tasks are in the greatest n
training.
How does a CINC go about identifying which
are “in the greatest need of training?” In add
subjective post-exercise commentary, a comple
objective MOE is needed to quantitatively evalu
performance in all potential Joint Mission Es
Tasks, but how is this efficiently done? One 
primary training tools available to a CINC for t
and evaluating his staff in this regard is an 
supported by a computer simulation model. 
commonly referred to as a Computer Aided E
(CAX). The primary role of the computer simula
to present a decision environment within wh
exercised staff can be presented with realistic sit
Although CAXs have proved to be an ess
training tool for a CINC and his staff, until recent
have been few methodologies available to quan
evaluate the results of the CAX. The research e
Combs (1995), Towery (1995), Brown (1996), 
(1996), Cwick (1996), Sullivan (1996), Thurman 
and Gordon (1996) developed individual metho
and measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to quan
evaluate the performance of a CINC’s staff in s
and distinct mission areas. These theses cov
topics of logistics support, intelligence fun
operational maneuver, carrier battlegroup 
warfare, amphibious logistics, mobilization pl
force protection, and operational firepower, resp
Given these tools, a CINC can begin to identify 
why an exercise produced a given outcome in
mission area. These methodologies assist in 
critical events in a scenario that significantly co
to its outcome. After this analysis, there still e
problem of formulating comprehensive MO
evaluate the staff’s overall performance in all 
areas.
Simply stated, the problem is that currently
no comprehensive tool for a CINC to look at an 
CAX and its results, accurately pinpoint critical e
any or all mission areas, and then determine w
critical events occurred. This paper devel
methodology and presents results from the Join
Level Simulation (JTLS).
2  METHODOLOGY
 Critical events are those events of a catastrophi
that singularly or in concert with a limited numbe
events could cause operational and/or strateg
consequences. Some examples of events of th
might be the loss of a tank battalion, the destru
forward deployed ground unit or the completi















































Given the stochastic nature of a CAX, it is po
for critical events to occur at any point in the s
Because a CAX is a training tool for the CINC
question of why the critical event occurred is 
importance. The vehicle for ascertaining the an
the audit trail. Audit trails are created by car
ex mination and manipulation of the simulation
processor output. The goal is to use the output
backward from the occurrence of a critical eve
attempt to discover the causal relationships.
Currently, the only capabilities investigators 
dev loping the audit trail are quantitative items
the exact time, place and strength of a unit w
critical event occurred. If all logically required as
present and functioning at the time of the critic
then it might be said that the event occurred d
stochastic nature of the model. This is the 
imparted by stochastic models. For example, a
defense system may be on station; however, sc
ill penetrate the air defense envelope. Any
threat, even though planned for, still has a 
probability of defeating the planned defense, re
of the level of preparation. This type of critical 
well xplained through audit trail analysis. The s
gets more difficult to evaluate when pieces see
mi sing from the puzzle. If, for instance, a majo
depot is destroyed by undetected enemy air for
is subsequently discovered, via the audit trail, 
depot was virtually unprotected, the CINC will w
know why.
The nature of combat is such that seemingl
events can eventually have a large impact o
outcomes. Compounding these events leads
cascading effect that may, in turn, become a
event. The nature of current audit trail analysis 
nearly impossible to answer the question of why various
events took place; this process will confirm on
th y did take place. In the context of the supply
x mple, the analyst can discover that an air de
was not located close enough to the supply de
question of why the unit was not close enough to pr
ufficient defense still remains.
In order to standardize the process of tracing
critical event’s audit trail, one must have a co
methodology that is applicable for any type of
event. One method that will achieve these go
checklist of all reasonable scenario parameters t
affect an event. One should be able to recons
ground, air and/or naval situation at any histori
during a training event. By using the following c
of general questions in the same manner fo
possible critical event, the causal relationships g

















































































Applications of the Universal Joint Task List to Joint Exercise Results 935· Time and location: When did the critical
occur, and what were the locations of all i
units and/or targets?
· Force strength: What are the force strengt
participating units in the critical event? A
reasonably too low? Do any of the particpating
units have key combat systems casualties?
· Environmental conditions: Did weather, vi
conditions, or terrain hamper or overly as
participating units in accomplishing their
missions?
· Command and control issues: Were units 
sides able to communicate? Were any 
pating units given multiple tasking or p
confusing orders?
· Logistics: Were there any supply shortfalls
they due to a lack of or a misallocation of a
· Intelligence: Were there any intelligence
falls? Were they due to a lack of or a m
cation of assets?
· Subjective issues: Did this critical event 
due to unexplained miscalculations or an 
a commander’s judgment, or due to chanc
Once these questions are posed and the 
questions answered, the analyst can then, if n
move to the next step of generating a set of critical event
specific queries.
3  JTLS SCENARIO
The Joint Theater Level Simulation is an inte
multi-sided, joint (air, land, sea, and special op
and combined (coalition warfare) constructive slation
model which is used as both a robust tool to
theater level operations plans and as a vehicle 
training exercises and seminar wargames. JTLS 
model conflict at the operational level with 
fidelity. Additionally, JTLS maintains documenta
how functional areas interact throughout the game.
JTLS uses SIMSCRIPT to support the need 
discrete time simulation. The advantage of the
time simulation is the ability to model activities 
been identified as critical events. The key proc
theater level, air land battle are most easily vis
a collection of discrete (key) events. These critic
may significantly change the state of the system
Rolands and Associates Corporation, the de
of JTLS, has created several routines which con
update ASCII output files with critical data dur
conduct of a JTLS exercise. These files have
developed in conjunction with the UJTL asse








































gagement results, resupply, and a number 
characteristics. The JTLS JMET output files com
the input to the database for subsequent data
JTLS version 2.1 employs the ORACLE Relati
Database Management System (RDBMS).
The selected JTLS scenario is set in the Sou
Asia theater of operations. The conditions exhibi
of an enemy seizure of the strategic initiative, su
degrading the ability to build combat power qu
theater. The scenario resulted in long distance
covered to bring forces in contact with the 
demonstrating the difficulty in generating comb
and establishing a temporal advantage. This sce
likely one for several reasons. These reasons cou
to the occupation of friendly assets in another r
the ability of an aggressor nation to recognize th
seize the initiative in the overall strategic situatio
The Iraqi forces in this scenario have at
across the border to Hafir-al-Batin in north centr
Arabia and to the Kuwaiti border along the coa
immediate objective was to seize the Tran
pipeline and control the flow of oil in northern
Arabia.
The deployment sequence was formulated t
for one brigade each from the 101st Airborne D
and 24th Mechanized Infantry Division to arrive 
difficulty at a port city near the city of Dhahran. 
the database already contained United Kingdom 
the region, they were used to support Saudi 
forces in the vicinity of King Khalid Military 
(KKMC). Finally, the Iraqi advance along the 
stopped short of crossing into Saudi Arabia, allow
deployment of two Marine Expeditionary Units i
area of Al-Khafji. Under the conditions of Iraqi st
initiative, forces attacked well in advance of an
presence in the region. Iraqi forces secure
operational initiative by conducting preempt
strikes on deploying United States forces. Forc
the 2nd Brigade of the 24th Mechanized In
Division (2/24th Mech) were given the mission t
west and support the defense of KKMC. The Ir
and ground efforts were designed to imped
movement.
4  CAUSAL AUDIT TRAIL ANALYSIS
4.1  Subjectivity in Analysis
In theory, the causal audit trail process can t
causal factors from any critical event down to t
minute detail of combat. In reality, the process’
factors are a lack of significant quantitative data
subjective battlefield decision. The causal audit








































































936 Parry, McAneny, and DromerhauserThis tree attempts to delineate all the possible c
critical event, enabling the analyst to follow the
provides the most likely cause, based on quatative
data. The branches of the tree end when the da
to determine the cause of a course of ac
unreasonably large, impossible to retrieve, or 
analyst is faced with finding the cause of a com
subjective decision.
The concept of being faced with a “subjecti
end” while performing wargaming analysis is
documented by Coleman Research Corporation
efforts to quantitatively evaluate the entire UJTL. CRC
concluded that of the 5199 UJTL tasks and
subordinate elements, only 4571 were capable
objectively quantified.
The remaining subjective or uncertain task
several different aspects of combat which stil
unmeasurable. When faced with judgments ab
aspects of combat while doing a causal au
analysis, the only alternative is to end that port
causal audit trail “tree” at the given subjective p
Several critical events are analyzed in Drom
and McAneny (1997). In order to demonstr
appreciation of the methodology, the Madinah 
Withdrawal is presented in this paper.
4.2  Critical Event: Madinah Division Withdrawal
The critical event involves the progress of th
Mech toward the objective area. After making
movement toward KKMC during the first day, th
impeded by a successful Iraqi air strike at 0.6
Damage was simulated and the resulting time
induced further delays. The 2/24th Mech ev
reached KKMC and engaged the Madinah Divi
battle, but the effects of this delay are not clear
Division began to withdraw from contact at day
endured a twelve hour conflict with the 2/24
during their retreat. After this, Coalition forc
contact with the Madinah, and the division was
to withdraw unimpeded. This sequence yields an
question to ask: Why was the Madinah Divisio
allowed to withdraw unimpeded?
In Brown’s (1996) efforts to measure suc
operational maneuver, he states that “some m
quantifying the first order effects of operationa
be determined.” He continues by suggesting 







































peed of any given combat system, or aggreg
systems. Instead, it must be relational, takin
account the operational maneuver of both frien
nemy forces, as well as the descriptive characte
the units over time.
The need for a relational descriptive parame
to Brown’s development of a measure of perfo
that is called the Fractional Closure Rate, or FCR:
FCR t
DISTANCE t t DISTANCE t
MAX DISTANCE t t DISTANCE t
f e tf e
f e f e












where f =a specified friendly maneuver element o
target
e =a specified enemy maneuver element or
t =time of capture of the data.
The numerator of the FCR is a representation
closure distance between two forces in som
interval, Dt, or more simply the approach velocity o
forces. Dividing by the maximum of the current d
between forces creates a measure which h
flexibility of demonstrating negative change in 
to the closure. Withdrawing at a certain distanc
negative FCR of the same magnitude as an adv
the same distance.
Brown further explains that “the Fractional C
Rate is developed only as a measure of perform
be incorporated into a measure of effectiven
maneuver. It does have some stand-alone us
measure of effectiveness of the ability of a fo
maintain a high operational tempo. This transla
quantitative measure of initiative and agility, usin
of attack as the data element.”
Brown’s first application of the utility of the F
wargaming is an analysis of the critical event: M
Division Withdrawal. The progress of 2/24’s mov
westward toward KKMC is exhibited in Figure 1,
curve behavior pointing to causal events which 
or facilitate that progress. The trend line, shown 
uses every three data points to calculate a 
average, which is a characteristic representatio
overall trends in initiative and momentum.
A slow, but successful movement toward
objective area is demonstrated by the gradua
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Time (Decimal Days)
FCR
RESULT: Momentum Lost due to delay from
damaged equipment and lack of interdiction
CAUSAL EVENTS:
(1) Iraqi air strike
(2) Unimpeded Iraqi
withdrawal























































. ThisFCR from first movement until the delay cause
Iraqi air strike at time 0.625. Damage is simul
the resulting time of repair induces further del
in turn, produces a drop in momentum u
completion of the first day. Additionally, the init
the ground offensive by the Madinah Division
movement away from the 2/24’s static locatio
decreasing the closure. As the damage is rep
closure ratio begins to increase rapidly for apprmately
0.25 days, or six hours. During this time the 2/2
to close on KKMC and the Madinah Division, an
the battle. The more pronounced spatial accele
slope of the FCR, is the result of the relational m
of the two forces moving toward the same locat
point in the battle. Madinah’s movement was n
to initiate ground combat with forces already a
thereby maintaining the operational initiative.
As Madinah begins to withdraw from contact
1.15, the FCR initially drops off before stabilizin
to the gradual rise exhibited in the first few ho
scenario. At this point in the battle Madinah b
lose its momentum, and the unimpeded 2/24 c
joins battle at approximately time 1.5. For t
twelve hours, the Coalition force is able to 
favorable tempo, but has arrived well after the I
was able to withdraw. Though creating a favora
from time 1.5 to 2.0, it is occurring at the ex
pursuing an enemy with whom they still have n
contact. Finally, at the beginning of the seco
Madinah continues its withdrawal uninhibited by




























are useful to a CINC in evaluating the exerc
efeated Iraqi force is able to reduce the FC
tran lates to an inability to prevent a force from
the battle area. If this were intentional, then th
simply an affirmation that the plan was 
conducted. If not, this analysis portrays the in
the 24th Mech to maintain the tempo and cr
favorable FCR with respect to the Iraqi forces.
The Madinah Division executes the with
along with the Hammurabi Division. The move
from the KKMC area of operations to suppor
along the coast. Given the lateral movement o
forces, a successful counterattack plan wou
slowed the withdrawal.
The “decision tree” for the Madinah withdr
shown in Figure 2. To answer the aforeme
question of why the Madinah Division is allo
withdraw unimpeded, the possible broad cate
c uses must be delineated. Was it due 
intelligence, 2/24’s lack of mobility, a supply s
low force strength, prior tasking of 2/24, or 
sequence of events nothing more than a 
op rational tactic?
Did 2/24 have any prior tasking that w
somehow impede their pursuit of Madinah? I  order
to investigate this question, the 2/24’s mis
posture data during the period leading up to M
withdrawal must be analyzed. Every unit in JT
both a mission and a posture. The mission is 
the last thing the unit was ordered to do. Th
describes what the unit is actually doing























































to Withdraw.  Why?







































d by ainformation is available in chronological order i
Unit Change List (Table 1), which shows that 2/2
MOVING posture from day 0.05526 to 0.6648, 
then shifts to a DEFEND posture, then ba
MOVING at 1.0013. It then briefly shifts ba
DEFEND at day 1.1169 until 1.5007.
















These observations tell the analyst that, f
reason, 2/24’s mission and posture shifte
DEFEND to MOVING almost immediately be
Madinah began their withdrawal at day 1.00
means that 2/24 had the correct mission and 
follow Madinah, eliminating this as a possible c
the critical event. However, at day 1.1169, 2/24 2/24’s












DEFEND posture which stopped 2/24 from pu
Madinah.
Was allowing Madinah to withdraw a produc
po r Coalition intelligence? This branch of the decisi
tree would be essential in most scenarios, but d
composition of coalition and opposing forces 
wargame, intelligence played an almost nonexis
No HUMINT or ELINT assets were allocated to e
side, and air reconnaissance assets were not 
because the Coalition forces were not allotted
assets. This artificiality was put in place strictly
purpose of enhancing the quantity of ground 
available for analysis. Had Coalition air force
used, the possibility of opposing ground force
quickly eliminated seemed very likely. The
intelligence related indicators that are availa
analysis are opposing and coalition’s perceptions of each
others strength and location.
The 2/24 receives accurate updates of Ma
location whenever Madinah’s location changes a
is within the range of its given sensors. These
may be radars, intelligence sources, or in th
eyeballs. When not within sensor range of Madin
perc ives them to be at their last known locatio
3). This figure shows the distance, in nautica
between Madinah’s actual location and wher
perceives Madinah to be. As could be expected
graph follows the timeline of the scenario: after
steady movement toward KKMC and staying c
Madinah during the first day, 2/24 was impede






















































ion.successful Iraqi air strike at 0.625 days. Dam
simulated and the resulting time of repair induce
delays. The 2/24th Mech eventually reached KK
engaged the Madinah Division in battle, then M
began to withdraw from contact at day 1.00
endured a twelve hour conflict with the 2/24t
during their retreat. After this, Coalition forc
contact with the Madinah, and the division was
to withdraw unimpeded.
Of all possible branches of the causal audit t
this one offers the most plausible one. The rea
did not follow Madinah in its withdrawal was 
certainly the fact that they did not know where 
was. Once Madinah exceeded the range of
sensors, there were no other Coalition force














Similar analysis of the perception of force st
is s own in Figure 4. The 2/24 maintains an ac
picture of Madinah’s force strength until they beg
withdrawal at day 1.0016 where, due to the in
range, 2/24 slightly underestimates Madinah’s force
strength. This can also be attributed to the 
C alition intelligence assets. The only Coalition
available to assess the strength of Madinah is 2/2
it is the only unit within range to perform this task
Had the scenario included other intelligence 
data, the following elements would be essent
analysis of the critical event:
· Report all of the organic intelligence 
regarding Madinah forwarded during the 
scenario, and compare with the actual tim


































































































940 Parry, McAneny, and Dromerhauser· Report which Coalition air recce assets
available and their tasking during the 
leading up to Madinah’s withdrawal.
· Report all air recce intelligence data forw
during the given period of inquiry, and co
with the actual times of events to determ
time late they are.
· Report all Coalition ELINT and HUMINT ass
available during the given period of inqui
their tasking during the same period.
· Report all ELINT and HUMINT data forwar
during the given period of inquiry, and co
with the actual times of events to determ
relevance.
Searching for the most likely cause of this 
event reveals that the “poor intelligence” bran
causal audit trail tree is the likely cause. Igno
potential subjective decisions that may have aff
scenario, the Coalition forces most glaring Achill
was their inability to track the enemy. This 
attributed almost entirely to their complete 
deployed intelligence assets.
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